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Abstract
Xinyu et al. proposed a public key exchange protocol, which is based
on the NTRU-lattice based cryptography. In this paper, we show how
Xinyu et al.’s NTRU-KE: A lattice based key exchange protocol can be
broken, under the assumption that a man-in-the middle attack is used
for extracting private keys of users who participate in the key exchange
protocol.
Keywords: Diffie-Hellman, Key exchange, Key recover attack, Man-in-the Mid-
dle attack, NTRU, Quantum resistance.
1 Introduction
Key exchange protocol is one of the public key cryptographic primitives that
provides a platform to negotiate keys among a group of parties. In a key ex-
change protocol, private keys can be exchanged among the group of parties over
public insecure communication networks and agree upon a common session key,
which can be used for later secure communication among them. A security goal
of the key exchange protocol is that private keys are to be shared among the
group of parties without compromising their secrecy. Key exchange protocol
works as one of the basic building blocks for constructing other high-level se-
cure protocols and is used to provide perfect forward secrecy in Transport Layer
Security’s ephemeral modes.
A key exchange protocol was introduced by Diffie-Hellman during 1976 in
their seminal paper [8]. The Diffie-Hellman (or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman)
key exchange protocol security relies on the (or Elliptic Curve) discrete loga-
rithmic problem over a finite field [4,6,8]. The Diffie-Hellman (or Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellmann) key exchange protocol is vulnerable to a quantum computer
attack as a result of the Shor’s algorithm [5]. Recent proposals [1,2,7] for key
exchange protocol are alternative candidates against quantum attack. In 2013,
Xinyu et al. proposed a public key exchange protocol [7] which is no longer de-
pendent on number-theoretic cryptographic hard assumption problems. Their
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proposal is based on the post-quantum NTRU-lattice based cryptosystem [3].
The NTRU lattice based encryption is a fast feasibly secured scheme introduced
in 1996 by Hoffstein et al. [3] and has been commercially standardized. The se-
curity of the NTRU cryptosystem [3] relies on the “shortest vector problem” and
the “closest vector problem”. Xinyu et al. proposed an NTRU - key exchange
protocol [7] by adapting the NTRU lattice based encryption scheme [3].
A man-in the middle attack is a cyber attack where an eavesdropper inter-
cepts a communication between two participated parties and injects his own
message. This attack can succeed only when the eavesdropper, Eve can imper-
sonate each endpoint to their satisfaction as expected from the legitimate other
end. This paper describes how Xinyu et al.’s NTRU-Key exchange protocol is
not safe against man -in-the middle attack; Eve is able to recover both parties’
private keys.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations and Mathematical Background
Throughout this paper, we denote Z the integer ring and Zq is the ring Z/qZ.
A truncated polynomial ring Rq = Zq[x]/(x
N − 1) consists of polynomials with
degree less than N and co-efficients in Zq. An element f ∈ Rq can be written
as a polynomial,
f =
N−1∑
I=0
fix
i = [f0, f1, ....., fN−1].
Two polynomials f and g ∈ Rq are multiplied by the ordinary convolution,
(f ∗ g)k =
∑
i+j≡k(modN)
(fi.gj), k = 0, 1, ..., N − 1, which is commutative and
associative. The convolution product is presented by * to distinguish it from
the multiplication in Zq. We define a center l2−norm of an element f ∈ Rq by
‖f‖2 = (
N−1∑
i=0
fi − f¯)
1/2, where f¯ = 1N
N−1∑
i=0
fi.
3 Xinyu et al.’s NTRU-Key exchange protocol
Xinyu et al.’s NTRU - Key exchange protocol [7] public parameters (N,p,q)
are chosen such that N- is a prime, p and q are co-prime, gcd(p, q) = 1, and
q is larger than p. The selection process of parameters is the same as the
NTRU-Encryption scheme [3]. Readers are encouraged to refer to [7] for further
details. We now present briefly Xinyu et al.’s NTRU - Key exchange protocol
in the following algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Xinyu et al.’s NTRU-Key Exchange Protocol
Alice Bob
Step 1:
fA
$
←− Lf ,gA
$
←− Lg Step 2:
hA = f
−1
A ∗ gA(mod q) hA−→
fB
$
←− Lf ,gB
$
←− Lg ,rB
$
←− Lr
Step3: hB,eB
←−−−
eB = prB ∗ hA + fB(mod q)
rA
$
←− Lr
eB = prB ∗ hA + fB(mod q) eB
−→
Step 4:
iA = fA ∗ eB(mod q) iB = fB ∗ eA(mod q)
KA = iA(mod p) = fA∗fB(mod p) KB = iB(mod p) = fB∗fA(mod p)
4 Man-in-the middle attack on Xinyu et al.’s NTRU-
Key exchange Protocol
In this section, we show weakness of Xinyu et al.’s NTRU-Key exchange pro-
tocol against man-in-the middle attacks. To show this Xinyu et.al’s protocol is
insecure against a man-in the middle attack, let us suppose an adversary, named
Eve listens to communication between both parties, Alice and Bob who believe
they are communicating with each other.
A man-in-the middle attack is described as follows:
-Step 1: An adversary, Eve intercepts both the public keys hA and hB
sent by Alice and Bob, respectively and computes two of her own public keys,
h
′
= f
′
−1 ∗ g
′
(mod q) and h
′′
= f
′′
−1 ∗ g
′′
(mod q) such that there exist the
inverse of f
′
and f
′′
in Rp and Rq. Then, she sends h
′
to Alice and h
′′
to Bob.
-Step 2: After receiving h
′
, Alice picks rA
$
←− Lr and computes e
′
= prA ∗
h
′
+ fA(mod q) and sends e
′
to Bob, but Eve intercepts it. Similarly, after
receiving h
′′
, Bob picks rB
$
←− Lr and computes e
′′
= prB ∗ h
′′
+ fB(mod q) and
sends eB to Alice, but Eve intercepts it.
Step 3: After intercepting e
′
and e
′′
sent by Alice and Bob, respectively,
Eve computes wA = e
′
∗ f
′
(mod q), K
′
A = wA ∗ f
′
−1(mod p) = fA(mod p) and
similarly, wB = e
′′
∗f
′′
(mod q), K
′
B = wB ∗f
′′
−1(mod p) = fB(mod p) to recover
Alice’s private key fA and Bob’s private keyfB, respectively.
5 conclusion
In this paper, we have described how Xinyu et al.’s NTRU-KE protocol is in-
secure against a man-in-the middle attack. The process of this attack has been
explained-how an attacker can recover private keys of both parties. Note that
Xinyu et al.’s NTRU-Key exchange protocol is trivially insecure against a man-
in the middle attack for unauthenticated public keys used in this protocol.
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